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Abstract 
Purpose: It is a common belief that an independent board improves firm 
financial performance and shareholders’ confidence. The separate 
leadership structure and independent chair of the board are considered to 
strengthen independence of the board. This paper, therefore, proposes to 
investigate that how Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG 
2012) impacted board independence (separate leadership structure and 
independent chair) and its relation with firm performance and 
shareholders’ confidence. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The proposed model of the paper 
based on agency theory and MCCG 2012, recommends to investigate that 
how MCCG 2012 impacted shareholders’ confidence with a mediation of 
firm performance in pre and post context of the code from 2010-2013. 
The proposed data regarding corporate governance will be collected from 
annual reports while firm financial performance (ROE & EPS) and 
shareholders’ confidence (share price) from DATA STREAM for a 
sample of 300 Malaysian listed companies.  
Findings: The MCCG 2012 anticipated that independence of the board 
will improve firm performance and shareholders’ confidence. However, 
these anticipations yet lack empirical support. Thus, this paper  proposes 
to find empirical evidence and fills the literature gap. 
Practical Implications: The proposed study will provide empirical 
evidence that how the code (separate leadership structure and 
independent chairman) impacted  its level of compliance, firm 
performance and shareholders’ confidence which will have value for 
Bursa Malaysia, Securities Commission, shareholders and management 
of the companies in Malaysia.     
Originality/Value: The limited literature regarding CG codes in pre and 
post context has been investigated in relation to firm performance.  This 
paper proposes to investigate the mediation role of firm performance 
between MCCG 2012 and shareholders’ confidence which has never 
been investigated earlier. Moreover, the proposed study will be the first 
study related to MCCG 2012 as the previous literature is regarding other 



















































Global Business & 
Management Research: 
An International Journal 
 
Vol. 7, No. 1, 2015 
 pp. 139-147 
Global Business and Management Research: An International Journal 




Keywords: Corporate Governance, Firm Financial Performance, Shareholers’ Confidence, 
Separate Leadership, Independent Chairman 
 




It is a common belief that corporate governance (CG) improves firms’ financial 
performance (Attia, 2012; Young, 2003) which boost up shareholders’ confidence as 
shareholders are more interested in firms’ profitability (Khanna & Zyla, 2010). CG 
improves firm performance which enhance shareholders’ confidence as evidenced by 
quick response of the stock market (Gompers et al., 2003). Weak implementation or 
compliance of CG practices leads to firms’ poor financial performance, which ultimately 
cause corporate failure (Sanjai Bhagat & Black, 2001; Sanjay Bhagat & Bolton, 2009; 
Norwani, Mohamad, & Chek, 2011). Firms’ poor financial performance leads to corporate 
failures which weaken shareholders’ confidence as they suffer the most (Khanna & Zyla, 
2010; Norwani et al., 2011).The goal of CG regulations is to improve firm governance and 
performance. Thus, the implementation and compliance of strong CG regulations enhance 
shareholders’ confidence (Bhagat & Bolton, 2009; Lama,  2013; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
Shareholders hesitate to provide their money to corporations on mere assurance of the 
managers that they will get their money back. They require a strong assurance in the shape 
of regulatory protection which can ensure the safe return of their money along with return 
(Klapper & Love, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). The 
regulatory theory postulates that regulations improves firms’ conformance and 
performance which enhance shareholders’ confidence (Sanjay Bhagat & Bolton, 2009; La 
Porta et al., 2000; Lama, 2013).  Therefore, many countries introduced CG legislations, 
regulations and codes to improve firms’ financial performance and enhance shareholders’ 
confidence (Abdullah, 2004; OECD, 2011; Petra, 2005). Malaysia also recently introduced 
its new CG code MCCG 2012 in March, 2012 with anticipation of improving firms’ 
financial performance and boosting up shareholders’ confidence. The code among others, 
mainly addressed independence of the board, as agency theory suggests that an 
independent board protects shareholders’ interests by ensuring effective monitoring of 
managers’ performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The effective monitoring role of board 
improves firms’ financial performance and minimizes chances of corporate failures which 
enhance shareholders’ confidence. The shareholders of developing and emerging markets 
consider CG as a mechanism of profit maximization hence firms’ better financial 
performance enhances their  confidence (Khanna & Zyla, 2010). Though shareholders’ 
primacy, regulatory and agency theories support  anticipations of the code, but it is also 
argued that Government or regulatory intervention for improving firms’ performance is an 
open debate with mixed arguments (Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998; Hussin and Othman, 
2012).Thus, this paper proposes to investigate the impact of separate leadership structure 
and independent non-executive chairman of the board as recommendations of MCCG 2012 
on shareholders’ confidence with a mediating effect of firm financial performance from 
2010 to 2013 in pre and post context of the code. The comparison of 2 year pre and 2 year 
post enactment periods of the code will highlight its impact on the level of compliance on 
the practices of separate leadership and independent chair of the board. Moreover, it will 
also explain that how these two practices impacted firm performance and shareholders 
confidence in Malaysia.The proposed study will test the assumptions of regulatory, agency 
and shareholders’ primacy theories in Malaysian context. It will contribute to the literature 
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as the limited literature regarding CG codes in pre and post context has been previously 
examined its relation mostly with firm performance (Owusu, Weir, & McLaverty, 2012). 
Whilst, this paper proposes to investigate the relationship between MCCG 2012 and 
shareholders’ confidence with a mediating effect of firm financial performance in pre and 
post context of the code, which has never been investigated earlier. Moreover, previous 
studies are regarding other CG codes in Malaysia or outside while this proposed study is 
regarding MCCG 2012 which has never been examined.  
 
Literature Review 
The literature evidenced investigations regarding CG and firms’ performance with mixed 
and inconclusive empirical findings (Ponnu, 2008). For example, some studies showing 
that CG has no relation with firms’ performance (Karpagam, 2013). In contrast, many 
studies concluded that CG has a positive impact on firms’ financial performance 
(AlMutairi, 2008; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Rahman, Ibrahim, & Zahid, 2014; Shukeri, 
Shin, & Shaari, 2012; Tham, Marn, & Romuald, 2012). It has been documented that the 
implementation and compliance of CG practices improve firms’ financial performance 
(Klapper & Love, 2004; Noor & Fadzil, 2013; Nur’ainy, Nurcahyo, Kurniasih, & 
Sugiharti, 2013; Velnampy, 2013) and their weak implementation or compliance leads to 
firms’ poor performance. Firms’ poor financial performance causes corporate failures 
which ultimately traumatize shareholders’ confidence as they suffer the most. Hence, the 
scandals of Perwaja Steel, Technology, Resources Industries (TRI), Transmile Air 
Services Sdn. Bhd., Megan Media Holdings Bhd, Malaysian Airlines System (MAS) and 
Port Klang Free Zone detroirated shareholders’ confidence in Malaysia (Nur’ainy et al., 
2013). The financial scandals of Linear Corporation (2008), Kenmark Industrial Co. Ltd. 
(2010), and Sime Darby (Sime) (2010) further weakened shareholders’ confidence in 
Malaysia (Hamid & Aziz, 2012; Hussin and Othman, 2012). In addition, the Global 
Financial Crisis 2007-08 also seriously damaged the trust and confidence of shareholders 
in Malaysia like other countries of the world (OECD, 2011). Bursa Malaysia index 
dropped by 670 points which was the biggest decline in the country after Asian Financial 
Crises 1997-98 (Angabini & Wasiuzzaman, 2011). Subsequentley,the Securities 
Commission Malaysia issued a new CG code MCCG 2012 in March, 2012 to improve 
firms’ financial performance and shareholders’ confidence. 
Malaysia introduced first CG code (MCCG 2000) in 2000 to boost shareholders 
confidence after Asian financial crises in 1997-98 (Abdullah, 2004). After different 
developments in domestic and international markets, Malaysia revised MCCG 2000 
(Revised MCCG 2007) in 2007 which superseded the previous code. The previous studies 
examined that how previous two CG codes (MCCG 2000 & 2007) impacted firms’ 
financial performance before and after the enactment of these codes in Malaysia (Hamid & 
Aziz, 2012; Noor & Fadzil, 2013). However, these studies are limited to investigating the 
impact of CG codes on firms’ financial performance and not extended to investigate 
shareholders’ confidence. The results of these previous studies are also mixed and 
inconclusive (Hamid & Aziz, 2012; Noor & Fadzil, 2013). For example, a study 
investigated the impact of MCCG 2000 on firms’ financial performance and reported that 
there was no relation between CG and firms’ financial performance before the 
implementation of the code. However, the relationship was positive after enactment of the 
code (Saad, 2010). Similarly, the impact of the board independence, expertise of the board 
and audit committee as practices of MCCG 2007 was analyzed on financial performance 
of Govt. Linked Companies (GLCs) in pre and post context of the code. The results only 
supported the expertise of audit committee in positive relationship with the financial 
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performance of GLCs after the enactment of the code (Hamid & Aziz, 2012). A study 
investigated the impact of MCCG 2007 on firms’ financial performance for 2 years i.e. 
2006 and 2008. The 2 year period of the study represented one year pre and one year post 
context of the code. The results stamped significant positive impact of boards’ 
characteristics on firms’ financial performance in the post enactment period of the code 
(Noor & Fadzil, 2013). Another evaluation of the relationship between MCCG 2007 and 
firms’ financial performance before and after enactment of the code found that board and 
audit committee both have significant positive impact on firms’ financial performance 
after enactment of the code (Noor & Fadzil, 2011). In contrast a study found that the 
practice of MCCG 2007- board of directors and audit committee  in relation to firms’ 
financial performance provide weak evidence to support that firm practicing good CG 
perform well as compared to those which don’t. The study doesn’t support the enactment 
of  MCCG 2007 (Hussin and Othman, 2012).  
The literature showing pre and post analysis of MCCG 2000 and MCCG 2007 clearly 
necessitates a study in a similar context for the new code MCCG 2012. Moreover, the 
previous literature is limited to CG codes and firms’ financial performance, ignoring 
shareholders’ confidence – survival of the companies. Thus, this paper proposes to 
investigate how specific practices of MCCG 2012 (separate leadership structure and 
independent non-executive chairman) impacted shareholders’ confidence with a mediating 
effect of firms’ financial performance in pre and post context of the code from 2010 to 





















Figure 1: Proposed Conceptual Framework 
 
Separate Leadership Structure and Firms’ financial Performance 
The separation of CEO and COB (Chairman of the board) is called separate leadership 
structure (Petra, 2005). The Agency theory postulates the separation of CEO and COB on 
account of effective monitoring of the managers’ performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
The recommendation # 3.4 of MCCG 2012 describes as:  
“The positions of chairman and CEO should be held by different individuals and the 
chairman must be a non- executive member of the board.” 
The separation of two roles of CEO and Chairman of the Board (COB) is supported by 
agency theory that it improves firms’ financial performance (Sanjai Bhagat & Bolton, 
2008; Tham et al., 2012). Yusoff & Alhaji, (2012) empirically endorsed this by 
documenting that duality has negative impact on firms’ financial performance. In contrast, 
stewardship theory suggests combination of the two roles of CEO and COB for firms’ 
better performance (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). In addition, the theory postulates that 
executives are stewards of the firm who protect shareholders’ interests and maximize their 
wealth. The stewardship theory  based on social psychology, proposes that managers’ are 
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committed towards firms’ success (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Shukeri et al., 
(2012) argued that duality of CEO doesn’t impact firms’ performance negatively. Apart 
from these positive and negative theoritical postulations and empirical evidences, Ponnu, 
(2008) deny any link between duality and firm performance. He argued that duality of 
CEO has no significant relation with firm financial performance.Thus, empirical results of 
the relationship of separate leadership structure with firms’ financial performance are 
mixed and inconclusive; hence needs to be further investigated specifically after the 
introduction of MCCG 2012. This paper, therefore, proposes further examination of the 
relationship from 2010-2013 in equal intervals of 2 periods representing 2 years before and 
2 years after enactment of the code. The hypothesis of the proposed study on the basis of 
agency theory are: 
H1 (a): Separate leadership structure is positively correlated to firms’ financial 
performance before MCCG 2012. 
H1 (b): Separate leadership structure is positively correlated to firms’ financial 
performance after MCCG 2012. 
 
Independent Non-Executive Director Chairman of the board and Firms’  financial 
Performance: 
Board has a key role in disciplining management and ensuring  internal governance of the 
firms (Fama, 1980). However, only an independent board can better perform this role. 
Independent non-executive chairman strengthen board’s independence which improve 
firms’ financial performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In absence of an independent outside 
director chairman the potential conflict between management and shareholders becomes 
more severe and complicated (Coles & Hesterly, 2000). The presence of an independent 
non-executive chairman becomes more important if the CEO is powerful and influential 
(Balsam, Puthenpurackal, & Upadhyay, 2011). Independent non-executive chairman is 
comparatively more free from the influence of management, which improve firms’ 
financial performance by ensuring better monitoring role of the board (Balsam et al., 
2011). The recommendation # 3.4 of MCCG 2012 explains that: 
“The positions of chairman and CEO should be held by different individuals and the 
chairman must be a non-executive member of the board”. 
The non executive chair of the board was proposed by Securities Commission (SC) in the 
CG blue print document. It included in the code after one month public response since 
proposed in July 2011. The empirical findings evidenced that outside chairman helps 
ensure effective monitoring of the board which improves firms’ financial  performance 
(Hussin and Othman, 2012). An increasing trend of appointing independent non-executive 
chairman has been found in the USA as they are considered to improve firms’ financial 
performance (Balsam et al., 2011). The announcement of independent chairman of the 
board is  positively responded by shareholders (Balsam et al., 2011; Coles & Hesterly, 
2000). On contrary, it is argued that independent non-executive chair of the board is costly 
(Coles & Hesterly, 2000). Moreover, the chair has low value in technical and complex 
corporations (Balsam et al., 2011). The inconclusive and mixed results of the limited 
literature regarding the impact of independent non-executive chairman on firms’ financial 
performance highlight the need for further investigation of the relationship. This 
investigation becomes more important after the introduction of MCCG 2012. Hence, this 
paper proposes to further investigate the impact of independent non-executive chairman on 
firms’ financial performance from 2010 to 2013. On the basis of agency theory following 
are hypothesis of the proposed study. 
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 H2 (a): The independent non-executive director chairman of the board (Independent 
leadership) is positively          
              correlated to firms’ financial performance before MCCG 2012. 
H2 (b): The independent non-executive director chairman of the board (Independent 
leadership) is positively      .  
             correlated to firms’ financial performance after MCCG 2012. 
 
Firms’ Financial Performance and shareholders’ confidence 
After legislations and regulations,  firm financial performance is the second key driver that 
determines shareholders’ confidence (Dailami & Masson, 2009). Financial performance 
not only explains the current but also predict firms’ future financial health (Menike & 
Prabath, 2014).The shareholders expect  higher return on their investments. Thus, an 
increase in share price enhances shareholders’ confidence  (Benali, 2013; Placido M. 
Menaje, 2012). The shareholders’ confidence is enhanced if firm maximize their wealth  
(Dobson, 1999 ; Oladipupo & Okafor, 2005; Dailami & Masson, 2009), while firm better 
financial performance maximizes shareholders’ wealth (Abdullah, 2004;Oladipupo & 
Okafor, 2005; Azhagaiah, 2008). Thus the appreciation of shares’ market price enhance 
shareholders’ confidence by maximizing their wealth (Dailami & Masson, 2009; Benali, 
2013; Placido M. Menaje, 2012). Many researchers concluded that there is positive 
relationship between firm financial performance and share price. The appreciation in share 
price increase shareholders’ confidence (Rafael La Porta et al. 2000; Velnampy, 2013; 
Dailami & Masson, 2009; Malik, 2012; Kehinde, 2012). On the basis of agency and 
shareholders primacy theories it is hypothesis that: 
H4 (a): Firms’ financial performance is positively correlated to shareholders’ confidence 
before MCCG 2012. 
H4 (b):Firms’ financial performance is positively correlated to shareholders’ confidence 
after MCCG 2012. 
 
Scope and Methodology of the Study 
The proposed study based on secondary data to be extracted from annual reports of 
Malaysian listed companies and DATA STREAM (Noor & Fadzil, 2013; Shukeri et al., 
2012) from 2010 to 2013. CG data will be extracted from Annual reports of the companies 
while data regarding  firm financial performance and share price will be collected from 
DATA STREAM for the proposed period. The paper proposes stratified random sample of 
300 listed companies from all sectors of the economy except banks and insurance 
companies due to their different governance requirements. Bursa Malaysia had 823 listed 
companies on the main board and 110 companies on ACE (Bursa Malaysia, 31 Dec. 2009; 
Noor & Fadzil, 2013). The paper proposes ordinary least square (OLS) and partial 
correlation for proposed analysis. 
 
Conclusion 
Shareholders’ primacy theory posits that the prime concern of corporations is to maximize 
shareholders’ wealth. The Agency theory postulates the same in other way that 
management as an agent of the shareholders has to protect shareholders’ interests by 
maximizing their wealth. However, management due to opportunistic behavior and access 
to firms’ resources serve their own interests rather shareholders’. Thus, the board has this 
role to monitor managers. However, this role can be only effectively performed if board is 
independent. Therefore, an independent board (separate leadership and independent chair) 
can ensure firms’ better financial performance which boost up shareholders’ confidence. 
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The separate leadership structure and independent outside chair of the board among others 
are considered to strengthen independence of the board. Hence, the MCCG 2012 also 
addressed these two with anticipation of fortifying independence of the board to improve 
firms’ financial performance and shareholders’ confidence. However, these postulations 
still lack empirical evidence. Therefore, this paper proposes to investigate these 
anticipations empirically by examining the impact of MCCG 2012 on firms’ financial 
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